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Abstract
When evaluating the rationality of a player in a game one has to examine counterfac-
tuals such as “what would happen if the player were to do what he does not do?” In this
paper I develop a model of a normal form game where counterfactuals of this sort are eval-
uated as in the philosophical literature (cf. Lewis, 1973; Stalnaker, 1968). According to
this method one evaluates a statement like “what would the player believe if he were to do
what he does not do” at the world that is closest to the actual world where the hypotheti-
cal deviation occurs. I show that in this model common knowledge of rationality need not
lead to rationalizability. I also present assumptions that allow rationalizability to follow
from common knowledge of rationality. These assumptions suggest that rationalizability
may not rely on weaker assumptions about belief consistency than Nash equilibrium.
KEYWORDS: Common knowledge, counterfactual reasoning, interactive epistemology,
rationalizability.
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1 Introduction
There is now a rich literature that explores noncooperative games in terms
of the rationality of the players and their epistemic state: what they know
about the game and about each others rationality, strategies, knowledge
and beliefs.1 The main goal of this literature is to determine exactly what
assumptions on the decision theoretic problem of each player would justify
game theoretic solution concepts such as rationalizability, Nash equilibrium
and backward induction, among others.
It is known that from an epistemic point of view not all solution con-
cepts are created equal. For example, while virtually everyone in the litera-
ture agrees that common knowledge of rationality leads to rationalizability in
normal form games, strong disagreement persists regarding whether common
knowledge of rationality leads to backward induction in perfect information
games. The source of this disagreement seems to be the serious di¢ cul-
ties that arise in the extensive form when formulating the relevant concepts
(knowledge, rationality, etc.) because of the need to address counterfactual
statements like if the player were to reach a certain node, which he knows
he wont, he would be rational from there on.
The purpose of this paper is to point out that the epistemic justication of
solution concepts in normal form games can be problematic for reasons that
are identical to those that complicate the justication of backward induction
in extensive games. The key to the problem is that, to justify the rationality
of a player at a given state one has to consider what would the player believe if
he were to do what he actually does not do. The problem arises because, since
the state species the strategy chosen and each player knows his own strategy,
there is no state that the agent considers possible in which he deviates, and
therefore, given the deviation, beliefs about strategies are not well-dened.
A way out of this situation is simply to ignore the fact that a deviation
is inconsistent with the players knowledge and to dene beliefs given a de-
viation to be as if he werent deviating. This is the traditional manner in
which this situation is handled in the game theoretic literature and, to be
sure, one in which common knowledge of rationality leads to rationalizability.
This characterization leaves us, however, wondering just what assumptions
are being made implicitly about the treatment of counterfactuals in this for-
1For excellent surveys of the literature see Binmore and Brandenburger [7], Geanakoplos
[12], Dekel and Gul [11], and Battigalli and Bonanno [8].
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mulation and whether there are other ways around this problem that are just
as sensible from a decision theoretic standpoint.
To study this carefully, in this paper I use the method by which counter-
factuals are captured in the philosophical literature after the work of Lewis
[14] and Stalnaker [18]. The aim of this method, as Stalnaker [19] puts it, is
generality: to make, in the denition of a model, as few substantive assump-
tions as possible about the epistemic states and behavior of players of a game
in order that substantive assumptions can be made explicit as conditions that
distinguish some models from others.2
According to this method one evaluates a statement like what would the
player believe if he were to do what he actually does not do at the state
that is closest to the actual state in which the hypothetical deviation actually
occurs. I dene beliefs given a deviation in this manner (that is, with respect
to the state that is closest to the actual state in which the deviation occurs)
and then rationality as payo¤maximization given those beliefs. I then show
that common knowledge of rationality in this model with counterfactuals
does not lead to rationalizability.
This reveals that the traditional model makes assumptions about the
treatment of counterfactuals that are far from innocuous in that they are
critical in generating the connections between rationality, knowledge and ra-
tionalizability. In this paper I also provide a statement of what those assump-
tions are. What they reveal is very interesting: that to justify the notion of
rationalizability in epistemic models one needs to make assumptions about
beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path,(that is, given deviations from the strate-
gies prescribed at a given state) that are very similar to those assumptions
underlying renements of Nash equilibrium such as subgame perfection in ex-
tensive games. This implies that it may be misleading to believe that, from
an epistemic point of view, rationalizability relies on weaker assumptions
about belief consistency than Nash equilibrium. I believe that the points
that I make here may be known to some (for example, Brandenburger and
Dekel [10] reached a similar conclusion in a very di¤erent setup). Never-
theless, there does not appear to be a careful discussion of this subtle issue
regarding counterfactual reasoning in normal form games in the literature.
The rest of this paper is aimed at presenting a coherent formulation and
proof of the claims made above. In Section 2 I present the formal statement
of the results and their proofs. In Section 3 I discuss the results. I conclude
2Stalnaker [19, p. 140].
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in Section 4. Although I present all the results for the case of two players I do
not foresee any di¢ culties in replicating the results for games with any nite
number of players when the relevant solution concept is that of correlated
rationalizability.
2 The Results
In what follows I use the standard notation and denitions as presented, for
example, in Osborne and Rubinstein [16], Aumann [2] and Halpern [13]. Let
a two-player game in normal form G = hS1; S2; U1; U2i be given where, for
each player i; Si is the set of strategies that are open to player i and Ui is
a function that represents player is preference relation over S = S1  S2: A
model of G is a tuple (
;K1;K2;p1;p2; s) ; where 
 is a set of states of the
world, Ki is player is information partition of 
; pi (;!) maps each state
! 2 
 to a probability distribution on the cell Ki (!) in partition Ki that
includes !. The interpretation is that player i has probabilistic beliefs on 

at state ! given by pi (;!) : Finally, s maps each state ! 2 
 to a strategy
prole s (!) = (s1; s2) : I write si (!) for si: The interpretation is that player
i chooses strategy si (!) at state !:
As usual, I assume that every player i knows his or her own type, that is,
si (!) = si (!
0) and pi (;!) = pi (;!0) whenever !0 2 Ki (!) :
An event E is a set of states. If E is an event dene the operator Ki on
events by
Ki (E) = f! : Ki (!)  Eg :
Ki (E) is the event that player i knows E. Set K (E) = K1 (E) \K2 (E)
and
CK (E) = K (E) \K (K (E)) \K (K (K (E))) \   
CK (E) is the event that E is common knowledge.
An event F is self-evident if Ki (!)  F for every ! 2 F and every
i = 1; 2. It is well known (cf. Osborne and Rubinstein [16, Ch. 4]) that an
event E is common knowledge if and only if there is a self evident event F
such that F  E:
I will denote a point mass probability distribution on ! by 1! and a
probability distribution q on a set f!1; : : : ; !ng by q1!1 +   + qn!n:
To abbreviate I will say that strategy si is a best response to a probability
qi on 
 whenever si is a best response to the distribution on Sj induced by
qi and conditioned on player is information:
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A strategy si 2 Si is rationalizable if for every player j = 1; 2 there is a
set Zj  Sj such that
 si 2 Zi; and
 every strategy sj 2 Zj is a best response to a belief qj of player j whose
support is a subset of Zi.
2.1 A-Rationality
Whether a player is rational at a given state ! depends both on the strategy
that the player uses at that state ! and the belief that the player maintains
about the opponents when considering deviations. However, as mentioned
in the Introduction, it is not completely clear what beliefs should the player
hold when considering deviations from the strategy prescribed in state !
because his own knowledge is contradicted in the face of such deviation: at
every state that he considers possible he does not deviate!
The traditional notion of rationality in the epistemic literature ignores
this and denes beliefs given a deviation to be as if the player werent de-
viating. Formally, one says that player i is A-rational at ! if there is no
si 6= si (!) such thatX
!02

pi (!
0;!)Ui (si; sj (!0)) >
X
!02

pi (!
0;!)Ui (si (!) ; sj (!0)) :
In words, player i is A-rational at ! if his strategy maximixes his expected
payo¤ given his belief at !:3
Using these denitions it can be easily shown following traditional meth-
ods that if at a state ! A-rationality is common knowledge then the strategy
prole s (!) is rationalizable. Let A-RAT consist of all the states where all
the players are A-rational. Let R consist of all the states where the strategies
chosen by the players at those states are rationalizable. The formal statement
is
Theorem 1 CK(A-RAT)  R:
Proof. See Osborne and Rubinstein [16, p. 80].
3The A in A-rationality is for Robert Aumann, following notation used in Halpern
[13].
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2.2 W-Rationality and S-Rationality
I now present two alternative notions of rationality that provide an explicit
treatment of counterfactuals such as what would the player believe if he were
to do what he actually does not do? As mentioned in the Introduction, I
use denitions that are close to the ones used by Stalnaker and Halpern in
their discussion of backward induction. Informally, player i is W-rational at
! if there is no deviation si 6= si (!) such that strategy si is preferred to
si (!) given the belief that player player i holds at the state closest to ! in
which i deviates to si: Alternatively, player i is S-rational at ! if at each
state closest to ! in which i deviates to every possible si 6= si (!) player i
holds belief pi and si (!) is a best response to pi:4 To make these denitions
precise we must specify what it means for a state to be the closeststate
to !:
To formalize I add an additional component to the traditional denition
of a model of G. An extended model of G is a tuple (
;K1;K2;p1;p2; s;f1; f2)
where (
;K1;K2;p1;p2; s) is a model of G and for every player i the function
fi (the selection function for player i) maps states and strategies for player
i into states, that is, fi : 
  Si ! 
: Intuitively, if fi (!; si) = !0, then
the state !0 is the state closest to !; according to player i, in which player i
deviates from the strategy prescribed by ! and, instead, plays si: To capture
this intuition I assume that for every player i the function fi satises the
following conditions:
F1. The deviation si takes place in fi (!; si), that is, si (fi (!; si)) = si; and
F2. Player i is the only one that deviates from s (!) in fi (!; si) ; that is,
sj (fi (!; si)) = sj (!) for all si 2 Si:
F1 guarantees that the deviation si takes place in fi (!; si) while F2 is
intended to capture the intuitive meaning of an unilateral deviation: at the
closest state to ! in which player i contemplates a particular deviation, player
j still plays sj (!) : Notice that F1 and F2 imply that, if si is chosen at !;
the strategy prole chosen at the closest state to ! where i chooses si is also
s.5
4The W in W-rationality is for weakly. The S in S-rationality is for Robert
Stalnaker, following notation used in Halpern [13].
5For a discussion and other applications of selection functions in the epistemic literature
see Halpern [13], Stalnaker [19] and Stalnaker [20].
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The stage is set to dene what rationality means in this context. Formally,
one says that player i is W-rational at ! if there is no si 6= si (!) such thatX
!02

pi (!
0; f (!; si))Ui (si; sj (!0)) >
X
!02

pi (!
0; f (!; si))Ui (si (!) ; sj (!0)) :
In words, player i is W-rational if there is no deviation si 6= si (!) such
that strategy si is preferred to si (!) given the belief that player player i
holds at the state closest to ! in which i deviates to si: The interpretation is
that the rationality of choosing strategy si (!) at state ! against a deviation
si 6= si (!) is determined with respect to beliefs that arise at the closest state
to ! in which si is actually chosen, that is, with respect to beliefs at f (!; si).
W-rationality is designed to be a notion of what it means for a strategy to
be rational when beliefs facing a deviation are consistent with the deviation
rather than with the actual strategy chosen. It is a notion of rationality that
is weaker than the one implied by traditional expected utility theory, yet it is
consistent with it. This consistency can be captured formally. Let U consist
of all the states where the strategies chosen by the players at those states
are not strictly dominated by a mixed strategy and UP  U consist of all
the states where the strategies chosen by the players at those states are not
strictly dominated by a pure strategy. Let W-RAT consist of all the states
where all the players are W-rational. The formal statement is
Lemma 2 W-RAT  UP : Moreover, for every normal form game G there
is an extended model in which the selection functions satisfy F1-F2 such that
U W-RAT.
Proof. See the Appendix.
As seen, W-rationality has almost as much bite as the traditional notion
of domination. A W-rational player will never play a strategy that is strictly
dominated by another pure strategy. Moreover, when a player chooses a
strategy that is strictly dominated by a mixed strategy, this can be seen as
a consequence of the player not being W-rational.
Example 1 Consider the game in Figure 1 (A Prisoners Dilemma). Be-
cause W-RAT UPa W-rational player will never play cooperate in this
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game.
Bob
D C
Ann D 3; 3 10; 2
C 2; 10 5; 5
(1)
Figure 1: A Prisoner0s Dilemma
Despite this consistency, it is important to notice that common knowledge
of W-rationality does not lead to rationalizability.
Example 2 Consider the game in Figure 2, taken from Osborne and Rubin-
stein [16, p. 61].
Bob
L R
T 3; 0 0; 1
Ann M 0; 0 3; 1
B 1; 1 1; 0
(2)
Figure 2:
Notice that the unique rationalizable strategy prole for this game isMR.
Consider the following extended model (
;KAnn;KBob;pAnn;pBob; s;fAnn; fBob)
of this game, where
 
 = f!1; : : : ; !6g ;
 KAnn (!l) = f!lg for l 6= 3; 4; KAnn (!l) = f!3; !4g for l = 3; 4;
 KBob (!) = f!g
 pAnn ( j !l) = 1!l for l 6= 3; 4; pAnn ( j !l) = 14!3 + 34!4 for l = 3; 4;
 pBob ( j !) = 1!;
 s (!l) = sl for l = 1; : : : ; 6; where sl is the l th element in the following
enumeration of S: fBL;ML; TL; TR;MR;BRg ; and
 fAnn and fBob are the unique selection functions satisfying F1-F2.
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In this extended model of the game in Figure 2 the selection functions
satisfy F1-F2 and yet CK(W-RAT) * R:
To see this I wish to show that in this extended model Ann is W-rational
at !1: Anns choice at !1 is B. Consider Anns deviation to M . What belief
does Ann hold when she deviates to M? The closest state to !1 in which
Ann chooses M is !2: At state !2 Ann believes that Bob chooses L with
probability one, and Ann prefers B to M given this belief. Now consider
Anns deviation to T . The closest state to !1 in which Ann chooses T is !3:
At state !3 Ann believes that Bob chooses R with probability 34 , and Ann
prefers B to T given this belief. Hence, Ann is W-rational at !1: I now want
to show that Bob is W-rational at !1: Bobs choice at !1 is L. Consider
Bobs deviation to R. The closest state to !1 in which Bob chooses R is !6:
At state !6 Bob believes that Ann chooses B with probability one, and Bob
prefers L to R given this belief. Hence, Bob is W-rational at !1: It follows
that W-rationality is common knowledge at !1; yet the strategies chosen at
!1 are not rationalizable for this game.
Remark 1 Notice that this does not contradict Theorem 1 since at state
!1 neither player is A-rational, and therefore A-rationality is not common
knowledge at !1: Notice also that the extended model is consistent with the
content of Theorem 1 as well: at state !5 A-rationality is common knowledge
and the strategies chosen at !5 are rationalizable. Moreover, since !5 is
the only state where rationalizable strategies are played, A-rationality is not
common knowledge at any state other than !5:
For some, W-rationality may be too large a departure from A-rationality
in the sense that si (!) may only be rational against deviations si 6= si (!)
for a belief that depends on the deviation being considered. In other words:
a player may be W-rational at ! yet si (!) need not be a best response to
any belief about the opponent. For example, Ann was W-rational at !1 in
the game discusses above yet her choice of strategy is strictly dominated by
the mixed strategy 1
2
T + 1
2
M and therefore sAnn (!1) is not a best response
to any belief about Bobs choice.
For this reason I consider a stronger notion of rationality; one in which
the same belief pi rationalizes a strategy si (!) against any deviation, that
is: (a) player i has belief pi at all the closest worlds to ! in which deviations
from si (!) actually occur, and (b) player i is W-rational at !: This is the
notion of S-rationality.
One says that player i is S-rational at ! if
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1. for every si; s0i 6= si (!) ; margSjpi (; fi (!; si)) = margSjpi (; fi (!; s0i)) ;
and
2. player i is W-rational at !:
The notion of S-rationality takes a minimal departure from A-rationality
in the sense that both involve the same standard notion of best-responding
to beliefs. They di¤er on their treament of the players beliefs but only
given the occurrence of events that are considered impossible by the players.
Both denitions are therefore strongly consistent with traditional subjective
expected utility theories. This strong consistency can be captured formally.
Lemma 3 A-RAT  U: Similarly, S-RAT  U in any extended model in
which the selection functions satisfy F1-F2. Moreover, for every normal form
game G there is a model such that U  A-RAT and an extended model in
which the selection functions satisfy F1-F2 such that U  S-RAT.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This lemma shows that without any assumptions on what the players be-
lieve both denitions of rationality place equivalent restrictions on outcomes:
those restrictions that arise from one round of deletion of strictly dominated
strategies. To illustrate consider the Prisoners Dilemma in Figure 1. Be-
cause S-RAT U; a S-rational player will never play cooperate in this
game. Another example of the restrictions imposed by S-rationality arises in
the game depicted in Figure 2. We saw before that B is strictly dominated by
the mixed strategy 1
2
T + 1
2
M: As a consequence, Ann can never be S-rational
at any state where she chooses B. This is so despite the fact that Ann can be
W-rational at a state where she chooses B. The model of this game used in
the proof of Theorem 2 is an example of this: at state !1 Ann is W-rational
and she chooses B.
Despite this equivalence between A-rationality and S-rationality, it is im-
portant to notice that, just as with W-rationality, common knowledge of
S-rationality does not lead to rationalizability.
Example 3 Consider the game described in Figure 3, which is a variant of
a game discussed in Basu [4].
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Bob
L M H
L 3; 3 10; 2 10; 1
Ann M 2; 10 5; 5 11; 4
H 1; 10 4; 11 10; 10
(3)
Figure 3: A Traveler0s Dilemma
Notice that the unique rationalizable strategy prole for this game is LL.
Consider the following extended model (
;KAnn;KBob; s;fAnn; fBob) of
this game, where
 
 = f!1; : : : ; !9g ;
 KAnn (!l) = f!lg for l 6= 2; 3; 6; 9; KAnn (!l) = f!2; !3g for l = 2; 3;
KAnn (!l) = f!6; !9g for l = 6; 9;
 KBob (!l) = f!lg for l 6= 4; 7; 8; 9; KBob (!l) = f!4; !7g for l = 4; 7;
KBob (!l) = f!8; !9g for l = 8; 9;
 pAnn ( j !l) = 1!l for l 6= 2; 3; 6; 9; pAnn ( j !l) = 110!2 + 910!3 for
l = 2; 3; pAnn ( j !l) = 110!6 + 910!9 for l = 6; 9;
 pBob ( j !l) = 1!l for l 6= 4; 7; 8; 9; pAnn ( j !l) = 110!4 + 910!7 for
l = 4; 7; pBob ( j !l) = 110!8 + 910!9 for l = 8; 9;
 s (!l) = sl for l = 1; : : : ; 9; where sl is the l th element in the following
enumeration of S: fMM;LM;LH;ML;LL;HM;HL;MH;HHg :
 fAnn and fBob are the unique selection functions satisfying F1-F2.
In this extended model of the game in Figure 3 the selection functions
satisfy F1-F2 and yet CK(S-RAT) * R:
To see this I wish to show that in this extended model Ann is S-rational
at !1: Anns choice at !1 is M . Notice that M is a best response for Ann if
she believes that Bob chooses H with probability 9
10
and M with probability
1
10
: I now want to show that this belief is held at every closest state to !1
where Ann deviates. Consider the closest state to !1 where Ann deviates
from M and chooses L. Such state is !2: At state !2 Bob chooses M , but
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Ann cannot distinguish between !2 and !3: Moreover, Ann believes that !2
occurs with probability 1
10
and !3 with probability 910 : Therefore, Anns belief
about Bobs choice at !2 is 110M +
9
10
H . Now consider the closest state to
!1 where Ann deviates from M and chooses H. Such state is !6: At state
!6 Bob chooses M , but Ann cannot distinguish between !6 and !9 and Bob
chooses H at !9: Moreover, Ann believes that !6 occurs with probability 110
and !9 with probability 910 : Therefore, Anns belief about Bobs choice at !6
is 1
10
M+ 9
10
H: Hence, Ann is S-rational at !1: The argument that shows that
Bob is S-rational at !1 is identical. It follows that S-rationality is common
knowledge at !1; yet the strategies chosen at !1 are not rationalizable for
this game.
Remark 2 The remark to Example 2 applies to this result without change.
Remark 3 Notice that the game in Figure 3 can be obtained from the Pris-
oners Dilemma by adding for each player a strictly dominated strategy,
H. Cooperation (that is, strategy prole MM which occurs at state !1)
in the Prisoners Dilemma can be a consequence of common knowledge of
S-rationality in the extended game by making M a best response to the added
strategy, and having beliefs at the closest states to !1 where the players devi-
ate to be that the other player chooses H with high probability. Such beliefs
are inconsistent with the strategies actually chosen by the players, but that is
just as in the denition of rationalizability.
The theorem above shows that common knowledge of S-rationality does
not lead to rationalizability in normal form games. A question that naturally
arises is: what extra restrictions does common knowledge of S-rationality
impose on the set of outcomes relative to those imposed by S-rationality
alone? The answer is: without further restrictions on the players beliefs,
none. The formal statement is
Lemma 4 CK(S-RAT)  U in any extended model in which the selec-
tion functions satisfy F1-F2. Moreover, for every game G there is an ex-
tended model in which the selection functions satisfy F1-F2 such that U 
CK(S-RAT):
Proof. See the Appendix.
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2.3 Beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path
We know that there is a sharp di¤erence between A-rationality and W-
rationality but, how to characterize the di¤erence between A-rationality and
S-rationality? An examination of both denitions reveals that they di¤er
exactly in which kinds of beliefs the players are supposed to have at cer-
tain states that are considered impossible by the players. In particular, A-
rationality does not allow the players to change their beliefs when doing
hypothetical reasoning whereas S-rationality does. This suggests a condition
on selection functions that guarantees that beliefs do not change at all when
doing hypothetical reasoning in the extended model.
One says that player i is B-rational at ! if
1. for every strategy si 2 Si;margSjpi (;!) =margSjpi (; fi (!; si)) ; and
2. player i is W-rational at !:
The notion of B-rationality requires that player i holds the same beliefs
at world ! as he does at the closest worlds to ! in which he deviates. It is
a restriction on beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path,(that is, given deviations
from the strategies prescribed at a given state) in the sense that, at states
that cannot occur from the point of view of the players, beliefs cannot be
arbitrary: they are restricted by what cannot occur at the worlds believed
to be possible by the players. It is the same kind of restriction on beliefs
that underlies renements of Nash equilibrium such as subgame perfection
in extensive games. As with A-rationality and S-rationality, one can show
that B-rationality places equivalent restrictions on outcomes as A-rationality:
those imposed by one round of deletion of strictly dominated strategies. Let
B-RAT consist of all the states where all the players are rational. The formal
statement is
Lemma 5 B-RAT  U in any extended model in which the selection func-
tions satisfy F1-F2. Moreover, for every normal form game G there is
an extended model in which the selection functions satisfy F1-F2 such that
U  B-RAT.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 3 applies here if one replaces in the proof the
terms S-RAT and S-rationality withB-RAT and B-rationality, respectively.
Despite this equivalence, the rst condition in the denition of B-rationality
captures the key di¤erence between A-rationality and S-rationality in that for
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every extended model of G in which the selection functions satisfy F1-F2 we
have that common knowledge of B-rationality does lead to rationalizability.
The formal statement is
Theorem 6 CK(B-RAT)  R in any extended model in which the selection
functions satisfy F1-F2.
Proof. The proof follows the one used by Osborne and Rubinstein [16, p.
80] suitably modied to incorporate the role of the selection functions into
the analysis. Pick ! 2 CK(B-RAT ): Then there is a self-evident event F
such that ! 2 F B-RAT : Let Zi = fsi (!0) 2 Si : !0 2 Fg for i = 1; 2.
Note that si (!) 2 Zi because ! 2 F and that for each !0 2 F there is
a belief pi that arises at every closest state to !0 where player i deviates
from si (!0) such that si (!0) is a best response to pi: Such belief is given by
margSjpi (; fi (!0; si)) :
It remains to be shown that the support of pi is contained in Zj. By the
rst condition in the denition of B-rationality, margSjpi (;!0) = pi: Recall
that, by denition, the support of pi (;!0) is a subset of Ki (!0) : Moreover,
since F is self-evident, we have Ki (!0)  F and therefore the support of pi
is contained in Zj.
The nal result is that common knowledge of B-rationality is indeed pos-
sible in an extended model in which the selection functions satises F1-F2.
The formal statement is
Theorem 7 For every normal form game G there is an extended model in
which the selection functions satisfy F1-F2 such that R  CK(B-RAT):
Proof. Fix a game G. Let Z1  Z2 be the set of rationalizable strategy
proles. For every i = 1; 2 and every rationalizable strategy si let pi (; si) be
a selection among the probability distributions on Zj such that si is a best
response to pi (; si) : Let the extended model (
;K1;K2; s;p1;p2; f1; f2) be
dened by:
 
 = f!ts : s; t 2 Sg and, for every player i = 1; 2
 Ki (!) = f!0 2 R : si (!0) = si (!)g if ! 2 R andKi (!) = f!0 2 
 : si (!0) = si (!)g
otherwise;
 margSjpi (;!) = pi (; si (!0)) if ! 2 R or ! = fi (!0; si (!)) for some
!0 2 R and pi (;!) = 1! otherwise;
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 s (!ts) = s;
 f1 (!ts; s1) = !ss1;s2(!ts) ; and
 f2 (!ts; s2) = !ss1(!ts);s2 :
Functions f1 and f2 are dened as in the proof to Lemma 2 and therefore
satisfy F1-F2. To see that R  CK(B-RAT ) pick ! 2 R. This means that
si (!) is a best response to a belief pi (; si (!)) whose support is contained in
Zj: I now want to show that margSjpi (; fi (!; si)) = pi (; si (!)) =margSjpi (;!)
for every si 2 Si. This will show that player i is B-rational at !:
If ! 2 R then margSjpi (;!) = pi (; si (!)) : But for every si 2 Si
there is a state !0 with si (!0) = si such that !0 = fi (!; si) and hence
margSjpi (; fi (!; si)) = pi (; si (!)) : Hence, player i is B-rational at !: This
shows that R B-RAT in this extended model. Now notice that by the
construction of Ki; if ! 2 R then Ki (!)  R for i = 1; 2 and therefore R is
a self-evident event. This means that if ! 2 R then B-rationality is common
knowledge at !; that is, ! 2 CK(B-RAT ):
3 Discussion
a. The Literature. All the literature on the subject of this paper (Bernheim
[5], Pearce [17], Brandenburger and Dekel [10] and Tan and Werlang [21])
takes the position that common knowledge of rationality leads to rational-
izability in normal form games.6 The point of view that the present paper
presents goes against this conventional wisdom by showing that one can come
up with notions of rationality that are very much like the traditional notion
(in the sense that they place equivalent restrictions on outcomes as the tra-
ditional notion) such that common knowledge of rationality does not lead to
rationalizability.
Nevertheless, there is a very clear, compelling intuition that relates com-
mon knowledge of rationality and rationalizability, and I make it clear how
this intuition relates to the notions of rationality that I develop. My aim
with this is not to criticize or disprove any of the previous work on the litera-
ture but to simply point out in a precise manner the strong belief restrictions
6Although there are quite natural conditions, not involving common knowledge of any-
thing, that lead to rationalizability. See Zambrano [22].
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underlying the apparently weak notion of rationalizability. In this sense this
paper shares the main goal of the paper by Brandenburger and Dekel [10].
The present paper owes a great intellectual debt to the work in Halpern
[13] and Basu [4]. Halpern [13] rst used Stalnakers approach to counterfac-
tual reasoning to substantiate Stalnakers informal argument that common
knowledge of rationality need not lead to backward induction. The methods
used in the present paper closely follow those in Halpern [13]. The di¤erence
is that here they are used to evaluate the epistemic justication of a solu-
tion concept for normal form games while he focuses on perfect information
games. The di¤erence is important because the position in the literature has
been that the paradoxes that counterfactuals create in games are inherently an
extensive form phenomenon. An exception to this point of view is presented
in Basu [4] who shows by example the problematic nature of rationalizability
in relation to the problematic nature of backward induction. Those papers
are direct precursors of the present work.
It is now understood that an adequate treatment of counterfactuals is key
to understanding the paradoxes that arise in extensive form games. In this
paper I argue that the situation is no di¤erent in normal form games, and that
the treatment of counterfactuals pioneered by Lewis [14] and Stalnaker [18] in
the philosophical literature can be very useful in undertanding the interplay
between knowledge, rationality, and rationalizability in normal form games.
To place this point of view in the context of the existing literature note
that, as far as the normal form is concerned, Dekel and Gul [11, p. 123]
acknowledged the counterfactual nature of choice in this type of games but
asserted that no elaborate theory of nearby states was necessary to deal with
its subtleties. Binmore [6, pp. 220-225], in turn, argues for a revision of
the traditional view about counterfactuals that game theorists have, even in
normal form games, but argues against using the closeststate approach by
saying that it is not clear what closestought to mean in the game theoretic
context. Stalnaker [19] has an explicit treatment of counterfactual worlds in
terms of selection functions, as in the present paper. His work di¤ers from
mine in that in his work beliefs in the counterfactual possible state fi (!; si)
for player i must be identical to those that the player holds at state !: It is
precisely the relaxation of this assumption that which allows me to distin-
guish between common knowledge of A-rationality and common knowledge
of S-rationality despite the fact that these two denitions of rationality, per
se, are equivalent from a purely decision theoretic standpoint.
In another direction, a number of papers have been devoted to provid-
15Zambrano: Counterfactual Reasoning
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005
ing the decision theoretic foundations of other solution concepts such as
Nash equilibrium (Aumann and Brandenburger [3]) and correlated equilib-
rium (Aumann [1]). The techniques developed in the present paper can be
used to investigate what exactly is being implicitly assumed in those papers
regarding o¤-pathbelief restrictions by allowing an explicit treatment of
counterfactuals in the analysis.
b. Counterfactuals. Key to the results presented above is that, because
the player knows his own strategy, and a state encodes the strategies chosen
by the players at that state, it is not clear what the players beliefs should
be if he were to deviate, because there is no state that the player considers
possible where he does deviate. A statement like what would the player believe
if he were to do what he actually will not do is a counterfactual. The reader
is warned not to treat counterfactuals of this sort lightly, for one really
cannot discuss rationality, or indeed decision making, without substantive
conditionals and counterfactuals. Making a decision means choosing among
alternatives. Thus one must consider hypothetical situations  what would
happen if one did something di¤erent from what one actually does.7
Furthermore, such hypothetical situations are not easy to interpret and
understand. Consider, for example, the counterfactual discussed in Aumann
[2, p.15]: If Hitler had crossed the channel after Dunkirk, he would have won
the war. Such statements are problematic because If Hitler had crossed
the channel, the world would have been di¤erent in a myriad of ways. To
assign meaning to such a conditional, one must be more specic about the
hypothetical world created by the crossing. That is a nontrivial task, even
in principle.8 For more on this see the excellent treatment of the role of
counterfactual reasoning in games found in Stalnaker [19] and [20].
c. Rationality. Rationality in this paper is either dened as some form of
not playing dominated strategies (as in W-rationality) or as best responding
to some beliefs (as in S-rationality and B-rationality) and key to the di¤er-
ences between the notions is how beliefs for a given player di¤er at state !
and at the states closest to ! where he deviates. It is important at this point
to recall the descriptive nature of epistemic exercises such as the one carried
out in the present paper. The epistemic view addresses not why the players
do what they do, not what should they do; just what do they do, what do
they believe (...)Not that i does a because he believes b; simply that he does
7Aumann [2, p. 15]
8Aumann [2, p. 15]
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a, and believes b.[3, pp. 1174-1175] Consistent with this point of view, the
intended interpretation in the models developed above of a statement like
player i believes b were he to deviate from ais not that i believes b because
he deviates from a; simply that he deviates from a, and believes b. For more
on the interpretation of epistemic exercises see below, as well as Aumann [1],
Stalnaker [20] and Aumann and Brandenburger [3].
d. The Analyst vs. The Player. Researchers in game theory usually
operate under what Myerson [15] calls the intelligence assumption. In My-
ersons words: if we [analysts] develop a theory that describes the behavior
of intelligent players in some game and we believe that this theory is correct,
then we must assume that each player in the game will also understand this
theory and its predictions.9 Wittingly or not, the assumption motivates
much of what is done in modern epistemic research. Clear evidence of this
can be found in Brandenburger [9]: Unless we want to accord the [analyst] a
privilegedposition that is somehow denied to the players, it is only natural
to ask what happens if a player can think about the game the same way.10
Were there no conation between the levels at which the analyst and
the players operate when reasoning about the game, the results presented
in this paper would not be of much relevance. When the epistemic model
is primarily a convenient framework to enable us-the analysts-to discuss
the things we want to discuss [about] actions, payo¤s, beliefs, rationality,
equilibrium, and so on,11 there are no counterfactuals in the normal form,
and rationality must be dened as it has always been (that is, as A-rationality
in this paper). But when we adopt the intelligence assumption and think of
the players as being able to talk about the things that [the analysts] want to
talk about,12 issues regarding counterfactuals become important and should
be dealt with explicitly in our theoretical exercises.
So we reach an interesting point in the discussion: one where the rel-
evance of the results presented in this paper depends on subtle aspects of
interpretation regarding the level (that of the analyst vs. that of the player)
at which the epistemic assumptions are supposed to be sound. I do not
wish to be judge on this matter. I prefer to leave it to the passage of time,
once people have had the chance to read and absorb the ideas in this paper,
for a conclusion regarding these matters of interpretation to be reached. I
9Myerson [15, p. 4].
10Brandenburger [9, p. 22].
11Aumann and Brandenburger [3, p. 1175]
12Aumann and Brandenburger [3, p. 1175].
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hope this paper will contribute in one way or another to the settling of this
important conceptual matter.13
4 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to point out that the epistemic justication of
solution concepts in normal form games can be problematic for reasons that
are identical to those that complicate the justication of backward induction
in extensive games. The key to the problem is that to justify the rationality
of a player at a given state of the state one has to consider what would the
player believe if he were to do what he actually will not do.
The traditional manner in which this situation is handled is to dene
beliefs given a deviation to be as if the player werent deviating. Common
knowledge of rationality given this denition of beliefs leads to rationalizabil-
ity. In this paper I present an alternative approach inspired on the method
employed by Halpern [13] to capture counterfactuals in a perfect information
game. According to this method one evaluates a statement like what would
the player believe (at a given state) if he were to reach a node which he knows
that will never be reached? at the state that is closest to the actual state in
which the node is actually reached. I dene beliefs given a deviation in this
manner (i.e., at the state that is closest to the actual state in which the devi-
ation actually occurs) and then show that common knowledge of rationality
given beliefs dened in this way need not lead to rationalizability.
This shows that the traditional model makes assumptions about the treat-
ment of counterfactuals that are critical in generating the connections be-
tween rationality, knowledge and rationalizability. In this paper I also pro-
vide a formal statement of what those assumptions are and they reveal that
to justify the notion of rationalizability in epistemic models one needs to
make assumptions about beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path, (that is, given devi-
ations from the strategies prescribed at a given state) that are very similar to
those assumptions underlying renements of Nash equilibrium such as sub-
game perfection in extensive games. This implies that it may be misleading
to believe that, from an epistemic point of view, rationalizability relies on
weaker assumptions about belief consistency than Nash equilibrium.
13I am very grateful to an anonymous referee for his valuable insights on these matters
of interpretation.
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5 Appendix:
5.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Assume ! =2 UP : Then there is si 6= si (!) such that, for all sj 2 Sj;
Ui (si; sj) > Ui (si (!) ; sj) : This in fact implies that for all !0 2 
; Ui (si; sj (!0)) >
Ui (si (!) ; sj (!
0)) ;and, therefore, that for all !0 2 
;
pi (!
0; f (!; si))Ui (si; sj (!0)) > pi (!0; f (!; si))Ui (si (!) ; sj (!0)) :
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Summing across all !0 2 
 we get that there is si 6= si (!) such thatX
!02

pi (!
0; f (!; si))Ui (si; sj) >
X
!02

pi (!
0; f (!; si))Ui (si (!) ; sj) ;
and hence player i is not W-rational at !:
Now for the second part. Pick a normal form game G: For every i = 1; 2
and every strategy si not dominated by a mixed strategy let pi (; si) be a
selection among the probability distributions on Sj such that si is a best
response to pi (; si) :
Consider the the extended model (
;K1;K2;p1;p2; s;f1; f2) where
 
 = f!ts : s; t 2 Sg and, for every player i = 1; 2
 Ki (!) = f!0 2 
 : si (!0) = si (!)g ;
 margSjpi (;!) = pi (; si (!0)) if ! 2 U or ! = fi (!0; si (!)) for some
!0 2 U and pi (;!) = 1! otherwise.
 s (!ts) = s;
 f1 (!ts; s1) = !ss1;s2(!ts) ; and
 f2 (!ts; s2) = !ss1(!ts);s2 :
It is not hard to see that the functions f1 and f2 satisfy F1-F2. I will
show this for player 1. The argument for player 2 is identical. Notice that
s1 (f1 (!
t
s; s1)) = s1

!ss1;s2(!ts)

= s1; so property F1 holds. Now notice that
for any s1 2 S1; s2 (f1 (!ts; s1)) = s2

!ss1;s2(!ts)

= s2 (!) and property F2
holds.
Now for the nal part. Pick ! 2 U: Then si (!) is not strictly dominated.
By Lemma 60.1 in Osborne and Rubinstein [16, p. 60 ] this means that si (!)
is a best response to pi (; si (!)) : Then margSjpi (; fi (!; si)) = pi (; si (!))
for every si 2 Si; by the denition of pi: There is, therefore, no si 6= si (!)
such thatX
!02

pi (!
0; fi (!; si))Ui (si; sj (!0)) >
X
!02

pi (!
0; fi (!; si))Ui (si (!) ; sj (!0)) :
Hence, player i is W-rational at !:
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5.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Let ! 2A-RAT ( resp. ! 2S-RAT). Then there is a belief pi = pi (;!) (resp.
pi = pi (; fi (!; si)) such that, for all si 6= si (!) ;X
!02

pi (!
0)Ui (si (!) ; sj (!0)) 
X
!02

pi (!
0)Ui (si; sj (!0)) :
This means that strategy si (!) is a best response to the belief pi: It is there-
fore not a never best response and, by Lemma 60.1 in Osborne and Rubinstein
[16, p. 60 ], it is not strictly dominated. Since this is true for every player
i = 1; 2, then ! 2 U:
For the second part pick a normal form game G and let pi (; si) and the
model (
;K1;K2;p1;p2; s) be dened as in the proof to Lemma 2:
 
 = f!ts : s; t 2 Sg and, for every player i = 1; 2
 Ki (!) = f!0 2 
 : si (!0) = si (!)g ;
 pi (;!) = pi (; si (!0)) if ! 2 U or ! = fi (!0; si (!)) for some !0 2 U
and pi (;!) = 1! otherwise.
 s (!ts) = s;
Also, consider the extended model where (
;K1;K2;p1;p2; s) is as before
and the selection functions are dened by
 f1 (!ts; s1) = !ss1;s2(!ts) ; and
 f2 (!ts; s2) = !ss1(!ts);s2 :
Functions f1 and f2 are dened as in the proof to Lemma 2 and therefore
satisfy F1-F2. Now for the nal part. Pick ! 2 U: By Lemma 2, ! 2W-
RAT and, as in the proof of Lemma 2, si (!) is a best response to pi (;!) =
pi (; si (!)) and therefore ! 2A-RAT : Because margSjpi (; fi (!; si)) = pi (; si (!))
for every si 2 Si; and since ! 2W-RAT, this means that the denition of
S-rationality is also satised at !: Hence, ! 2S-RAT :
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5.3 Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 3 shows that S-RAT U in any extended model in which the se-
lection functions satisfy F1-F2. Therefore, since CK(S-RAT )S-RAT, it
follows that CK(S-RAT ) U:
For the second part x a game G and let pi (; si) be as in the proof to
Lemma 2 and the extended model (
;K1;K2; s;p1;p2; f1; f2) be dened by :
 
 = f!ts : s; t 2 Sg and, for every player i = 1; 2
 Ki (!) = f!0 2 U : si (!0) = si (!)g if ! 2 U andKi (!) = f!0 2 
 : si (!0) = si (!)g
otherwise;
 pi (;!) = pi (; si (!0)) if ! = fi (!0; si (!)) for some !0 2 U and
pi (;!) = 1! otherwise;
 s (!ts) = s;
 f1 (!ts; s1) = !ss1;s2(!ts) ; and
 f2 (!ts; s2) = !ss1(!ts);s2 :
Functions f1 and f2 are dened as in the proof to Lemma 2 and therefore
satisfy F1-F2. To see that U  CK(S-RAT ) pick ! 2 U . This means that
si (!) is a best response to a belief pi (; si (!)) : I now want to show that
margSjpi (; fi (!; si)) = pi (; si (!)) for every si 2 Si. This will show that
player i is S-rational at !:
If ! 2 R then for every si 2 Si there is a state !0 with si (!0) = si such
that !0 = fi (!; si) and hence margSjpi (; fi (!; si)) = pi (; si (!)) : Hence,
player i is S-rational at !: This shows that U S-RAT in this extended
model. Now notice that by the construction of Ki; if ! 2 U then Ki (!)  U
for i = 1; 2 and therefore U is a self-evident event. This means that if ! 2 U
then S-rationality is common knowledge at !; that is, ! 2 CK(S-RAT ):
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